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Abstract
This paper uses information from a rich ﬁrm-level survey on wage and price-setting pro-
cedures, in around 15,000 ﬁrms in 15 European Union countries, to investigate the rela-
tive importance of internal versus external factors in the setting of wages of newly hired
workers. The evidence suggests that external labour market conditions are less important
than internal pay structures in determining hiring pay, with internal pay structures binding
even more often when there is labour market slack. When explaining their choice ﬁrms
allude to fairness considerations and the need to prevent a potential negative impact on
effort. Despite the lower importance of external factors in all countries there is signiﬁcant
cross-country variation in this respect. Cross-country differences are found to depend on
institutional factors (bargaining structures); countries in which collective agreements are
more prevalent and collective agreement coverage is higher report to a greater extent in-
ternal pay structures as the main determinant of hiring pay. Within-country differences
are found to depend on ﬁrm and workforce characteristics; there is a strong association
between the use of external factors in hiring pay, on the one hand, and skills (positive)
and tenure (negative) on the other.
JEL Codes: J31, J41.
Keywords: Wage rigidity, newly hired workers, internal pay structure, employee
turnover, business cycle, survey data.5
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Using information from a rich ﬁrm-level survey on wage and price setting practices in 15 Eu-
ropean Union countries, we investigate the determinants of the wages of newly hired workers.
The evidence collected contributes to the debate on the ﬂexibility of wages of new hires (see,
inter alia, Haefke et al.,2008; Gertler and Trigari, 2009; Pissarides, 2009) an issue of great
importance for job creation and for the behavior of employment and wages over the business
cycle.
We ﬁnd that external factors, such as the wages of similar workers in terms of qualiﬁcations
receive less attention in setting wages of new hires compared to internal pay structures or col-
lective agreements. Furthermore, the extent to which employers are reluctant to differentiate
the wages of newly hired workers from those paid to incumbents varies depending on labour
market conditions; with more ﬁrms prepared to pay a higher than a lower wage. When explain-
ing their reluctance to deviate from the going wage in hiring pay, employers refer to fairness
considerations and the possible negative impact of such a decision on worker effort conﬁrming
the importance attributed to such considerations by inter alia Bewley (1999).
However, this average sample behaviour masks differences in hiring pay practices between as
well as within countries. Cross-country differences are strongly correlated with institutional
factors such as bargaining structures, while within-country variation appears to be correlated
with ﬁrm, workforce and product market characteristics. The skill and tenure composition
of the workforce appear to be associated with hiring pay determination. Firms in which the
workforce is more skilled are more likely to use external labour market conditions in hiring pay
determinationsincethewagepaid insuch ﬁrms islikelyto behigherthan thegoingwage. Firms
with a long-tenured workforce are less likely to deviate from the going wage since internal
pay structures are very important. External labour market conditions are also important for
ﬁrms facing a higher degree of competition, while they are less important for ﬁrms with high
collective agreement coverage since in the latter type of ﬁrms collective agreements prevent the
payment of a lower wage.
This being a survey, and despite the fact that employers were asked hypothetical questions
about what they would do when faced with high unemployment or short labour supply, the
results cannot be generalised. The survey was conducted at a time when labour markets were in
general tight. The economic and ﬁnancial crisis that has started to unfold since the second half
of 2008 could prove that employers behave differently.
Non-technical Summary
and experience outside the ﬁrm and the availability of similar workers in the labour market,6
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1. Introduction
Microstudiesofthedegreeofwage rigidityusuallyfocus onthewages ofemployeesin ongoing
employment relationships. The degree of rigidity of the wages of newly hired workers —
with rigidity in this context referring to the absence of deviations of the wage paid to new
hires from that paid to incumbent employees with similar qualiﬁcations and experience —has
been investigated less. This is so despite the importance of the matter for job creation and
for the behaviour of employment and wages over the business cycle (see inter alia Pissarides,
2009 and Haefke et al., 2008). For example, using a macro-economic model that allows for
different degrees of rigidity in the wages of new hires versus incumbents, de Walque et al.
(2009) show that higher stickiness of wages of new hires leads ﬁrms to respond to shocks by
adjusting employment. As a result, the response of nominal wages and inﬂation to shocks is
subdued.
Empirical research on the degree of rigidity in the wages of newly hired workers relies, in most
instances, on earnings data for individuals moving between jobs with rigidity being measured
by the extent to which macroeconomic conditions impact on the wages of job changers. Most
studies ﬁnd that hiring pay is considerably more procyclical than the pay of incumbents (see,
inter alia, Vroman, 1977 and Vroman, 1978; Bils, 1985; Carneiro et al., 2008 and Pissarides,
2009, for an overview). In order to ﬁnd out, however, whether the apparent responsiveness of
wages is capturing compositional effects (e.g. due to the procyclicality in the share of quality
jobs) rather than true ﬂexibility in hiring pay, one should control for ﬁrm, individual and job
characteristics. Whiletheuseofdataonindividualsmovingbetweenjobscontrolsforindividual
characteristics, it does not permit conditioning on ﬁrm and job features unless this information
is also available. Gertler and Trigari (2009) argue that the use of matched employer-employee
datasets with information about the job is important in testing for such wage rigidity. Alter-
natively, one could use qualitative ﬁrm-level survey data to address the issue of wage rigidity
of newly hired employees, since in that case the employer directly reports on the practices fol-
lowed (see, inter alia, Bewley, 1999; Agell and Lundborg, 2003; Hall and Krueger, 2008). The
results from studies using these last two types of data — matched employer-employee datasets
with information about the job and direct survey data — are not conclusive.
This paper adds to the empirical literature on the wages of newly hired workers by using a rich
ﬁrm-level survey dataset to investigate the extent to which pay of new hires in a large number
of ﬁrms located in 15 European Union (EU) countries is rigid. More speciﬁcally, the following
ﬁve questions can be addressed with the available data:
a. What is the relative importance of external labour market conditions compared to internal
pay structures in the determination of the wages of newly hired workers?
b. Does the relative importance of external labour market conditions in the determination of
the wages of newly hired workers vary according to the prevailing labour market condi-
tions?
c. What reasons do ﬁrms report for being reluctant to deviate from the going wage?
d. Is there cross-country variation in the relative importance of external labour market con-
ditions in determining hiring pay, and is this related to differences in institutions?
e. Which type of ﬁrm is more likely to be inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by external labour market
conditions in determining the pay of new workers?7
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The results suggest that external labour market conditions are relatively less important than
internal pay structures in determining hiring pay. When explaining their choice ﬁrms allude to
fairness considerations and the need to prevent a potential negative impact on effort. Cross-
country differences are found to depend on institutional factors (bargaining structures) while
within-country differences are found to depend on ﬁrm and workforce characteristics; a skilled
workforce and a short-tenured workforce increase the probability of using external factors in
hiring pay determination.
Thepaperis organisedas follows. Section 2 setsout theframework withinwhich weanalysethe
determination of pay of newly hired employees. Section 3 starts off with a brief presentation
of the data set used and proceeds to address questions (a)-(c) set out above. Section 4 looks
at cross-country differences in the practices determining hiring pay and investigates the role
of institutional factors in explaining these differences (question (d) of the above). Section 5
focuses on the associations of ﬁrm and workforce characteristics with cross-ﬁrm differences
in the use of external factors (question (e) of the above). Finally, Section 6 summarises and
concludes.
2. A Framework for Analysing the Determination of Pay of Newly Hired
Workers
In a schematic way, and borrowing from Hall and Krueger (2008), employers can either offer
new employees a predetermined (posted) wage or they can bargain with them over the wage. In
the former case, the predetermined wage could be either the wage paid to existing employees
with the same qualiﬁcations, as in Gertler and Trigari (2009), or some other wage.
Gertler and Trigari argue that, for reasons of economies of scale in bargaining, the posted wage
is likely to be the contract wage. By implication, the extent to which wages are posted depends
on the prevailing institutional setting in which bargaining takes place. In countries or sectors
in which collective bargaining is common, the posted wage is likely to be the contract wage.
In contrast, economies of scale are unlikely to be reaped if individual-level bargaining is the
norm. Hall and Krueger (2008) ﬁnd some evidence that sectoral and institutionalfeatures deter-
mine the extent of wage posting; ‘Union members and those who took government jobs report
knowing the wage exactly with substantially higher frequency.’(p.12)
Firms might not be willing to deviate from an established internal pay structure if such a de-
viation impacts negatively on workers’ effort. As Bewley (1999) explains at length, ﬁrms are
conscious of negatively affecting worker motivation since this shapes the extent to which work-
ers cooperate, share information and take initiatives. Differences between ﬁrms in the extent
to which worker cooperation, information sharing and development of initiatives is important,
explains why the adoption of and abidance by an internal pay structure is not universal. Ac-
cordingly, Bewley distinguishes between primary and secondary jobs. Primary jobs are usually
long-term and full-time, whereas secondary jobs are often short-term and part-time.1 Primary-
job employers are concerned with the impact of pay on employee turnover, on their ability to
hire in the future, on the quality of job applicants, and on worker morale. Secondary-job em-
ployers, on the other hand, are predominantly interested in being able to hire since they know
1 A similar distinction was made by Okun (1981) between career jobs and casual jobs. Okun states ‘One would
expectwagesfor casual jobsto respondmuchmoreto cyclicalweaknessofthe labourmarketthanwagesforcareer
jobs’ (Okun, 1981; p.106).8
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that this will be a recurring event. Each business activity sector can contain both primary and
secondary jobs although in certain sectors one type of job dominates. For example, manufac-
turing companies have in general a larger share of primary-type jobs, while most jobs in retail
trade and hotels and restaurants are more likely to be of the secondary type.2
Firm-levelcharacteristics which may inﬂuence thelikelihoodof havingan internal pay structure
include the line of business, as already mentioned, the age of the ﬁrm and whether the ﬁrm is
expanding or not.
Workforce characteristics determining hiring pay ﬂexibility include workforce tenure and
turnover, the use of variable pay, type of working contract (indeﬁnite or ﬁxed), number of
working hours (part-time vs full-time), and the skill composition of the workforce. Internal
equity considerations are linked to long tenure and low employee turnover. Since employees on
ﬁxed-term contracts and those working part-time are less likely to engage in pay comparisons
within the ﬁrm, employers have less reason to link their pay to that of full-time employees
on permanent contracts. However, ﬁrms with a high share of employees either on ﬁxed-term
contracts or working part-time are more likely to follow a collectiveagreement in order to avoid
frequent bargaining. Furthermore, it is likely that employers when setting the pay of specialised
and managerial jobs pay more attention, than when setting the wages of semi-skilled or skilled
workers, to external labour market conditions. Bewley ﬁnds that wages of newly hired skilled
and semi-skilled workers are more rigid than those of employees in managerial jobs since the
latter kind of jobs are more difﬁcult to deﬁne and to compare across individuals.
Finally, product market characteristics such as the structure of the product market in which
the ﬁrm operates can also impact on the ﬂexibility or otherwise of hiring pay. Conditional on
labour costs being an important share of total costs, lower hiring pay which leads to a decrease
in prices, could be to the advantage of ﬁrms facing more intense competition and high demand
elasticity.
The above suggest that the probability of wage rigidity in the wages of new hires depends
both on institutionalfeatures (bargaining structures) and on workforce, ﬁrm and product market
characteristics.
3. The Importance of External Factors in the Determination of Pay of
Newly Hired Workers
3.1 The Data
The data used in this paper are drawn from the replies of Chief Executive Ofﬁcers or Human
Resource Managers of around 15,000 ﬁrms to a ﬁrm-level survey on wage and price-setting
procedures conducted in 15 EU countries using a more or less harmonised questionnaire.3 The
survey was conducted in each country once at some point between Summer 2007 and Spring
2008. The questionnaire was developed by the survey group of the Wage Dynamics Network
(WDN), a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) Research Network studying wage and
2 Foster et al. (2002) compare job ﬂows between manufacturing and retail trade in the US and conclude that job
ﬂows are around 50% higher in retail trade compared to manufacturing.
3 The15countriesare: Austria,Belgium,CzechRepublic,Estonia, France,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Lithua-
nia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. More information on the survey questionnaire and the
sample can be found in Druant et al. (2009).9
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labour cost dynamics in the euro area (EA) and the EU and the implications of these dynam-
ics for monetary policy. The survey collects information on wage and price-setting practices;
wage-setting practices refer to those followed by the largest occupational group within the ﬁrm,
while information on price-setting practices is drawn with reference to the ﬁrm’s main product.
The dataset is not fully balanced in two respects: ﬁrst, although a core set of sectors (manufac-
turing, trade, transport & communication) is covered in all countries, certain sectors (utilities,
construction, ﬁnancial intermediation, non-market services, hotels & restaurants and business
services) are not sampled in all countries.4 Second, although the vast majority of variables is
available for all countries, some variables are missing from a number of countries.5
The main value added of this paper is that instead of trying to infer the degree of rigidity of the
wages of new hires through employees’ wages, managers themselves reveal the main determin-
ing factor of new hires’ pay and, in some countries, also provide their reasoning behind their
behaviour.6 The pitfall, on the other hand, is the absence of actual wage data. The principal
variables of interest for this paper arise from the following three questions:7
Q.I Considering the main occupational group in your ﬁrm please choose a single option to
indicate the most relevant factor in determining the entry wage of newly hired employees:
a. The collective pay agreement (independently of the level at which this is signed)
b. The wages of similar employees in the ﬁrm
c. The wages of similar employees outside the ﬁrm
d. The availability of workers with similar characteristics in the labour market
e. Other reasons
Q.II If there is abundance in the labour market in terms of the workers you are seeking to hire,
do you pay newly hired employees a signiﬁcantlylower wage than that paid to individuals
with similar qualiﬁcations and experience already employed in the ﬁrm?
a. Yes
b. No, because
i. This would be perceived as unfair and earn the ﬁrm a bad reputation
ii. This would impact negatively on the work effort of new employees
iii. This is prevented by labour regulation or the collective pay agreement
iv. Unions would contest such action
v. Due to other reasons
Q.III If there is a shortage in the labour market in the workers you need to hire, and you have
difﬁculty in attracting new workers, do you give newly hired employees a signiﬁcantly
higher wage than that paid to similarly qualiﬁed employees already in the ﬁrm?
4 Some sectors are missing from just a handful of countries (e.g. business services are covered in all countries
bar Spain, hotels and restaurants are also covered in all countries with the exception of Belgium). Other sectors,
however, are only sampled in a few countries (e.g. utilities, construction, ﬁnancial intermediation and non-market
services).
5 A minor asymmetry also exists with respect to ﬁrm size; while in all countries the sample includes ﬁrms with
over 5 employees, for the Czech Republic only ﬁrms with over 20 employees are included in the sample.
6 Blinder (1990) and Bewley (1999) discuss the value of survey data in economic analysis.
7 Details of differences in the formulation of the questions in a few countries, as well as the way these were dealt
with, can be found in the Appendix.10
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i. This would be perceived as unfair by existing employees
ii. This would have a negative effect on the work effort of existing employees
iii. This is prevented by labour regulation or the collective pay agreement
iv. This would generate pressure by existing employees for wage increases
v. Due to other reasons
In what follows, we assume that external (internal) labour market conditions are the most im-
portant determinant of hiring pay if ﬁrms choose options c or d (a or b) in Q.I.
3.2 Do the Wages of Newly Hired Workers Follow the Internal Pay Structure or the
Labour Market?
Table 3.1 summarises the replies to the ﬁrst question (Q.I). Information is presented for the
full sample and for three subsamples which arise from the differences in the formulation of Q.I
and the availability of information on the second and third questions (Q.II and Q.III). Column
(1) refers to the full sample, the second column (Sample A) presents data for a sample of the
12 countries which asked for a single option in Q.I (all countries except for France, Italy and
Poland), and the third column (Sample B) shows the information for three countries, excluded
from Sample A, in which ﬁrms ranked the options in Q.I.8 The fourth column (Sample C) refers
to the sample of eight countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia), in which ﬁrms were also asked Q.II and Q.III.
The fact that stands out from all samples is the lower importance given to external factors in
the determination of the wages of newly hired workers.9 Column 1, which reports the results
for the full sample, shows that only about a ﬁfth (21.7%) of all ﬁrms report that external labour
market conditions are the most important determinant of hiring pay. The breakdown between
the two internal and the two external factors is best judged from column 2 which includes only
the replies from ﬁrms in countries which asked for a single option; the support for each of
the two internal sub-factors (collective pay agreement, wages in the ﬁrm) and the two external
sub-factors (wages outside the ﬁrm, available labour supply) is similar further justifying the
decision to group the two internal and the two external factors together. As the results presented
in column 3 suggest, the ﬁrms scoring options also ranked internal factors higher than external
factors. Finally, internal factors also dominate in the determination of wages of new hires in
Sample C—the subsample of countries which provide answers to Q.II and Q.III. (column 4).
Since the four sub-factors are exhaustive, external and internal factors are complementary. The
rest of the paper is couched in terms of external factors.
3.3 Does the Relative Importance Given to External Factors Vary According to Labour
Market Conditions?
The reluctance of ﬁrms to follow labour market conditions as signaled in their responses to Q.I.
is conﬁrmed through their positive replies to the second and third questions (Q.II and Q.III)
8 The Appendix outlines the transformation followed to make the replies of Sample B countries consistent with
those of Sample A.
9 A two-sided t-test cannot, at the 1% level, reject the hypothesis that the proportions arising from the different
subsamples are equal.11
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Table 3.1: Importance of Internal and External Labour Market Conditions
in Hiring Pay Determination (% of ﬁrms)
Factora Full sample Sample Ab Sample Bc Sample Cd
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Collective pay agreement N/A 40.5 N/A (2.7) N/A
Wages in the ﬁrm N/A 46.0 N/A (3.1) N/A
Internal factors 78.3 86.5 70.6 (2.9) 74.2
Wages outside the ﬁrm N/A 6.5 N/A (2.2) N/A
Labour supply N/A 7.0 N/A (2.6) N/A
External factors 21.7 13.5 29.4 (2.4) 25.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Survey database
a Employment weighted averages
b Sample A includes the 12 countries (AT, BE, CZ, EE, GR, HU, IE, LT, NL, PT, SI, SP) in which ﬁrms selected a
single option in Q.I.
c Sample B represents the three countries (FR, IT and PL) which ranked options (a)-(d) in Q.I. on a 1-4 scale
increasing in relevance (not relevant-1, of little relevance-2, relevant-3, very relevant-4). The average score is
presented in brackets.
d Sample C includes the eight countries (CZ, EE, GR, HU, IT, LT, PL, SI) in which Q.II and Q.III were also asked.
for the sample of eight countries (Sample C in Table 3.1) which asked these questions (Table
3.2). While the information presented in Table 3.2 is consistent with the ﬁgures in Table 3.1,
in that it conﬁrms the reluctance of ﬁrms to deviate from the going wage, it seems that even
fewer ﬁrms are willing to deviate from the going wage when the issue is posed more directly.
The gap is not due to differences in sample composition; to the contrary the support for external
factors in column 4 of Table 3.1 which looks only at the subsample of eight countries for which
information on Q.II is available (25.8%) is higher than for the whole sample (21.7%).
The information presented in Table 3.2, although not direct since it refers to a hypothetical
situation, suggests that hiring pay policy may vary depending on whether the labour market is
loose or tight. A little over 13% of ﬁrms report they would pay new hires a wage lower than
the going wage in a loose labour market, while 16% of ﬁrms are prepared to pay a wage higher
than the going wage in a tight labour market. A one-sided t-test shows that the difference is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Finally, a mere 5% of ﬁrms are prepared to be ﬂexible in both loose
and tight labour markets.
3.4 What Prevents Firms from Deviating from the Going Wage?
A value added of surveys is that one can also ask ﬁrms for the reasons behind certain behaviour.
Firms were asked to explainwhy they were reluctant to deviatefrom the wagepaid to incumbent
workers when setting the wages of new hires. Table 3.3 reports the distribution of ﬁrms across
the different reasons given. The point that stands out is the importance attributed by ﬁrms to
fairness considerations and to the possible negative impact on effort.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the conclusion reached by Bewley (1999, 2007) who reports
that ﬁrms are especially wary of the negative impact that a deviation from the going wage, even12
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Table 3.2: Deviation of Hiring Pay from the Going Wage Depending on Labour Market
Conditions (% of ﬁrms)
Direction of deviation and labour market conditions %a,b
Lower wage in loose labour market 13.4
Higher wage in tight labour market 16.0
Deviation in both loose and tight labour markets 5.3
Source:Survey database
a Refers to the sample of eight countries (CZ, EE, GR, HU, IT, LT, PL and SI) which asked Q.II and Q.III.
b Employment weighted averages
for newcomers, could have on the morale of the workforce.10 In addition, there is a signiﬁcant
role for labour regulations and collective agreements in preventing the offer of a wage lower
than that paid to incumbents in a weak labour market.
Next we explore some of the cross-country differences in the replies given to Q.I-Q.III.
Table 3.3: Reasons Preventing Deviation from the Going Wage for New Hires
(% of ﬁrms amongst those replying they would not deviate)
Reasons preventing the payment of:a,b L o w e rw a g e H i g h e rw a g e
Unfair/bad reputation 32.9 39.2
Negative impact on effort 36.2 35.3
Labour regulation/Collective agreement 28.1 11.7
Unions would contest such action 1.6 —
Possible pressure for wage increases — 13.0
Other 2.9 2.6
Source:Survey database
a See notes a and b to Table 3.2
b Each column sums to a little over 100 since some ﬁrms selected more than one reason.
4. Cross-country Differences in Hiring Pay Determination and the Role
of Bargaining Structures
Simple averages as those in Tables 3.1-3.3 might hide substantial heterogeneity not least be-
tween countries. This section addresses two questions. First, do the summary statistics in the
tables above vary across countries? Second, is this cross-country variation linked to differences
in bargaining structures?
10 Fehr et al. (2009) take a slightly different view claiming that fairness considerations are only important for
incumbent workers.13
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4.1 Cross-country differences in the rigidity of hiring pay
The data in Table 4.1 below suggest substantial cross-country variation in the relative impor-
tance of external factors. In Spain, Austria and Slovenia less than 10% of ﬁrms reply that
external factors are the main factor determining hiring pay, while in Lithuania and Poland this
is true for over 40% of ﬁrms. Table 4.2 presents the percentage of ﬁrms in each country pre-
pared to pay a lower (higher) wage in a loose (tight) labour market. The variation here is not as
large as that in Table 4.1—as evidenced also by the signiﬁcantly lower coefﬁcient of variation
of the ﬁgures—a result no doubt also due to the smaller number of countries for which this
additional information is available. A fact that stands out, however, is that countries differ in
the extent to which their behaviour is symmetric in the two distinct labour market states. While
in Estonia, Greece and Slovenia the percentage of ﬁrms willing to pay a lower wage in a loose
labour market does not differ considerably from that prepared to pay a higher wage in a tight
labour market, the same is not true in other countries. In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy
substantially more ﬁrms are prepared to pay a higher wage in a tight labour market than to pay
a lower wage in a loose labour market.11 A formal test of the equality of the two proportions
within countries is rejected (at the 1% level) in all countries except in Estonia and Slovenia.
Table 4.1: Importance of External Labour Market Conditions in Hiring Pay Determination:
Individual Country Evidence (% of ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r y )
Countrya,b % ﬁrms Country % ﬁrms
Austria (AT) 7.3 Italy (IT) 13.1
Belgium (BE) 14.0 Lithuania (LT) 41.6
Czech Republic (CZ) 13.0 Netherlands (NL) 12.3
Estonia (EE) 32.0 Poland (PL) 50.5
France (FR) 32.5 Portugal (PT) 23.3
Greece (GR) 26.5 Slovenia (SI) 8.3
Hungary (HU) 11.6 Spain (ES) 4.4
Ireland (IE) 26.9 Total 21.7
Source: Survey database
a Employment weighted averages.
b The coefﬁcient of variation of the above ﬁgures is 64.2%.
4.2 The Role of Bargaining Structures in Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Hir-
ing Pay Determination
This section tests whether cross-country differences in bargaining structures can explain cross-
country differences in the relative support for external factors. The arguments in the literature
presented in Section 2 suggest hiring pay might depend on the prevailing institutional setting.12
11 We do not investigate here at length the reasons behind this asymmetry. However, from preliminary work in
this direction, we are not able to ﬁnd evidence to support the Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2008) hypothesis that
the asymmetry in hiring pay procedures reﬂects composition bias; the asymmetry is also observed within sectors.
Babeck´ y et al. (2008) attribute the asymmetry in the Czech Republic to collective bargaining agreements which
prevent underbidding.
12 In the context of a single country, Bewley (1999), in his survey of US ﬁrms, ﬁnds that both union and non-union
ﬁrms set the pay of new hires so as to be comparable with that of incumbents with similar skills suggesting that
institutional differences are not important.14
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Table 4.2: Deviation of Hiring Pay from the Going Wage Depending on Labour Market
Conditions (% of ﬁrms in each country)
Countrya,b Loose labour market Tight labour market In both conditions
Czech Republic (CZ) 10.4 16.2 4.1
Estonia (EE) 18.1 17.9 5.3
Greece (GR) 15.5 15.1 2.9
Hungary (HU) 11.8 17.3 6.3
Italy (IT) 12.5 23.5 7.6
Lithuania (LT) 18.4 12.4 6.1
Poland (PL) 15.7 5.8 2.9
Slovenia (SI) 4.4 4.0 1.0
Total 13.4 16.0 5.3
Source: Survey database
a Employment weighted averages.
b The coefﬁcient of variation of the ﬁgures in each of the above three columns are 34.7%, 46.1% and 48.4%
respectively.
We focus on two dimensions of bargaining structures: (a) the enforcement or otherwise of a
collective agreement—independently of the level this agreement is signed at, and (b) collec-
tive agreement coverage. Cross-country differences across these dimensions are signiﬁcant as
widely documented (see, inter alia,D uC a j uet. al., 2008; OECD, 2004) and as revealed by
evidence from the survey used in this paper. In some countries — such as Austria, Belgium,
France, Italy, Slovenia and Spain—nearly all ﬁrms enforce a collective agreement, while in
others—such as Hungary, Estonia and Poland—less than 20% of ﬁrms enforce a collective
agreement. Figure 4.1 suggests that there is in fact a negative association between the per-
centage of ﬁrms signing a collective agreement and the percentage of ﬁrms reporting external
factors as the main determinant of hiring pay. Estimates of this relationship using a generalised
linear model conﬁrm this relationship which given a pseudo-R2 of 0.40 is quite strong. As
expected a negative association is also found between collective agreement coverage and the
percentage of ﬁrms reporting external factors as the main determinant in hiring pay (see Figure
4.2). Estimates suggest that this relationship is somewhat stronger with a pseudo-R2 of around
0.50.
Two further bargaining structure dimensions we looked at are: ﬁrst, the level of centralisation
at which bargaining takes place, and second, the degree of coordination between ﬁrms in each
country. Using data from OECD(2004) and Du Caju et al. (2008) we ﬁnd that centralised
bargaining is associated with low relative importance of external factors conditional, however,
on low inter-ﬁrm coordination.
The above suggest that institutional differences between countries regarding bargaining struc-
tures can go some way towards explaining cross-country differences. The next section explores
the role of ﬁrm, workforce and product market characteristics in explaining both within-country
and cross-country differences in the importance assigned to external factors.15
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5. The Role of Firm, Workforce and Product Market Characteristics in
Determining Hiring Pay
Notwithstanding cross-country differences, the evidence presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 sug-
gests that even within countries there is substantial variation in the degree to which external
factors are important in determining hiring pay. This section proceeds with an empirical formu-
lation of the framework outlined in Section 2 focusing on the potential role of ﬁrm, workforce
and product market characteristics in explainingdifferences between ﬁrms in the use of external
labour market conditions in determining the pay of new hires.
The probability that external labour market conditions determine hiring pay is assumed to be
correlated with three types of information giving the model the following general form:
Pr(Ei =1 )=Φ ( Fi,W i,P i) (5.1)
where Pr(Ei) is the probability that ﬁrm i reports external factors as the most important deter-
minant of hiring pay for the largest occupational group in the ﬁrm. In the empirical formulation,
Φ denotes the normal distribution function and the equation is estimated as a Probit, F repre-
sents factors relating to ﬁrm characteristics (e.g. line of business, size, age of the ﬁrm etc.), W
contains workforce characteristics (e.g. skill composition of the workforce, percentage of tem-
porary or part-time workers, extent of variable pay etc.) and P captures characteristics relating
to the structure of the product market in which the ﬁrm operates. Similarly, the following two
equations, (5.2) and (5.3), are used to model the probability that ﬁrms pay a lower or a higher
wage respectively.
Pr(Li =1 )=Φ ( Fi,W i,P i) (5.2)
Pr(Hi =1 )=Φ ( Fi,W i,P i) (5.3)
In Table 5.1 we report pooled, across countries, estimates of speciﬁcations describing the use
of external factors. These equations relate the use of external factors to variables proxying the
characteristics of secondary-sector ﬁr m sa si d e n t i ﬁed by Bewley (1999). The results presented
are of a descriptive nature and do not constitute an attempt to construct a structural model since
thedatasetdoesnotpermitustoaddressissuesofpotentialendogeneity. Allestimatedequations
include country dummies to account for the cross-country differences identiﬁed in the previous
section.
Column 1 includes only sectoral and country dummies. According to Bewley primary and sec-
ondary type jobs can be found in all lines of business. However, some lines of business include
more jobs of one or the other type. The sample used in this section includes only the three
lines of business sampled in all countries: manufacturing, distribution (trade), and business ser-
vices. The marginal effects reported in column 1 suggest that ﬁrms in distribution and business
services use external factors to a greater extent than manufacturing ﬁrms; compared to manu-
facturing ﬁrms the probability of using external factors is 3.2 percentage points higher for ﬁrms
active in trade and 7.8 percentage points higher for business service providers. However, once
ﬁrm and workforce characteristics are included (as in columns 2–4), the sector dummies are no17
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Table 5.1: Marginal Effects from a Probit Regression of Pr(Ei =1 )
Variables Only sector dummies Basic Use tenure Restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manufacturing (Reference group)
Trade 0.032*** 0.004 -0.001 0.004
[0.000784] [0.778] [0.956] [0.826]
Business services 0.078*** 0.017 0.011 0.025
[0] [0.254] [0.538] [0.202]
5-19 employees 0.033** 0.046** 0.053***
[0.0288] [0.0111] [0.00756]
20-49 employees 0.007 0.020 0.010
[0.610] [0.260] [0.580]
50-199 employees (Reference group)
>200 employees 0.011 0.005 -0.003
[0.407] [0.804] [0.892]
Coverage -0.081*** -0.076*** -0.090***
[0] [0] [0]
Low-skilled BC (Reference group)
High-skilled BC 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.038*
[0.000251] [0.00444] [0.0395]
Low-skilled WC 0.073*** 0.048** 0.042*
[0] [0.0333] [0.0830]
High-skilled WC 0.138*** 0.107*** 0.096***
[0] [0] [0]
Log of gross ﬂows 0.012** 0.011
[0.0149] [0.118]
Proportion of employees with
over 5 years tenure
-0.091***
[0]
Competition intensity 0.028** 0.031** 0.025*
[0.0113] [0.0191] [0.0848]
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test—country dummies χ2(14)=833.6 χ2(13)=493.2 χ2(9)=312.7 χ2(9)=274.3
Observations 10,624 6,992 4,638 4,073
Observed prob. 0.198 0.209 0.229 0.231
Pseudo R2 0.0934 0.124 0.113 0.112
Robust p-values in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
longer jointly signiﬁcant. This suggests the sector dummies capture some of the variation in
the incidence of collective agreements and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Size dummies are
also not jointly signiﬁcant, in any of the speciﬁcations presented, although small ﬁrms appear to
be more likely than medium-sized (ﬁrms with 50-199 employees) to use external factors. Coun-
try dummies continue to be jointly signiﬁcant (see F-test at the bottom of Table 5.1) but their
contribution to explaining the overall variation of the dependent variable drops substantially
once ﬁrm, workforce and product market characteristics are introduced in column 2.
In general, the results in columns 2–4 support the Bewley hypothesis that external factors are
used in the determination of the pay of new hires in secondary-sector/jobs. Four results stand
out. First, employee turnover—measuredeither by the size of gross ﬂows in the ﬁrm (column 2)
or by the proportion of employees with tenure over 5 years (column 3)—is correlated with the18
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relative importance of external factors. More speciﬁcally, a change in the ratio of gross ﬂows
(employees entering and exiting the ﬁrm as a percentage of the workforce) from 25% to 80%, is
associated with an increase in the probability of using external factors by over one percentage
point (from 21% to 22.2%). The impact from the change in tenure is, as expected, in the same
direction. However, giventhatthetenure variableis less noisythan theﬂows variabletheimpact
from tenure is more sizeable. The tenure composition variable is unfortunately missing for ﬁve
countries (BE, ES, FR, IT, NL). The results, however, from this more restricted sample of 10
countries (AT, CZ, EE, GR, HU, IE, LT, PL, PT, SI), show that an increase in the percentage
of employees with over 5 years tenure from 10% to 70% decreases the probability of using
external factors by 6 percentage points (from 27% to 21%). To make sure that the change in
the sample does not affect the overall estimates, column 4 reports the results from estimating
the speciﬁcation in column 2 using the restricted sample of 10 countries i.e. excluding the ﬁve
countries for which the tenure variable is missing. The coefﬁcients on most variables do not
differ much from those reported in columns 2 or 3. The size of the coefﬁcient on the log of
gross ﬂows remains the same, although this is no longer signiﬁcant.
The second result is the positiveassociation between the skill level of the workforce and the use
of external factors. Firms are classiﬁed into four groups depending on whether the dominant
group in the ﬁrm is blue-collar low-skilled (production), blue-collar high-skilled (technical),
white-collar low-skilled (clerical) or white-collar high-skilled (professional/managerial). The
results show that, ceteris paribus,i nﬁrms in which skilled white-collar workers are the domi-
nant group, the likelihood that external factors are more important is higher (by 13.7 percentage
points) compared to what happens in ﬁrms in which low-skilled blue-collar workers are the
dominant group.
The third result is the higher use of external factors in ﬁrms facing more competitive product
market conditions.13 More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms which are more likely to follow competitors in
lowering prices have a higher probability (by 2.5 percentage points) of using external factors.
An alternative test for the impact of product market competition on hiring pay procedures was
conducted for the subsample of manufacturing ﬁrms for which we have information on the ex-
port share in sales. These results conﬁrm the results reported in column 2; companies with a
high export share–i.e. facing more intense international competition – are more likely (coef-
ﬁcient signiﬁcant at the 10% level) to report that external factors are the main determinant of
hiring pay.
Finally, and in line with the results of Section 4, it turns out that ﬁrms with high collective
agreement coverage have a substantially lower probability of reporting external factors as the
main determinant of hiring pay. For a ﬁrm with full coverage, this probability is around 3.7
percentage points lower compared to a ﬁrm in which only half the workforce is covered.
Along the lines suggested in Section 2 we tried a number of other variables capturing workforce
characteristics: the percentage of pay linked to performance, the percentage of part-time em-
ployees and the percentage of employees on ﬁxed-term contracts. While the percentage of pay
linked to performance enters positively in a non-linear fashion — indicating that performance-
related pay is related to overall ﬂexibility—the variable is missing for a number of observations
thus restricting the sample further. The proportion of part-time and ﬁxed-term employees enter
witha coefﬁcient different to that expected; more part-time(ﬁxed-term) employmentis found to
be associated negativelywith the use of external factors. In the ﬁrst instance, this would suggest
13 The competition dummy is missing for the Netherlands, hence only 14 countries are used in column 2.19
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that the hypothesis that part-time and ﬁxed-term employment is associated with more restricted
use of internal pay structures (or alternatively more extensive use of external factors)—because
these workers are by deﬁnition not in the job for long — cannot be accepted. A possible inter-
pretation of the negative coefﬁcient is that ﬁrms which depend more on part-time or ﬁxed-term
contracts sign collective agreements more extensively in order to avoid frequent bargaining.14
Our next step is to ﬁnd out whether coefﬁcient estimates are robust across countries and more
speciﬁcally whether the variables of interest are picking up cross-country rather than within-
country effects. We break up the full sampleintotwo groups of countries according to coverage.
The ﬁrst group of countries includes the 10 countries (AT, BE, GR, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT, ES and
SI)—all of which belong to the euro area—in which collective agreement coverage is high, and
the second group includes the remaining ﬁve countries—all of which are not part of the euro
area—in which collective agreement coverage is low (CZ, HU, EE, LT, PL). The two groups
differ, however,not only with respect to the average collectiveagreement coveragebut also with
respect to the degree of within-group homogeneity in this respect; the coefﬁcient of variation of
coverage for the ﬁrst group of countries is only 50%, while for the second group of countries it
is over 200%.
Table 5.2 presents coefﬁcient estimates from estimating the same equation as in column 3 of
Table5.1 forthetwo groupsof countries: high and lowcoverage.15 The resultssuggestthat with
the exception of the coverage variable the other variables are picking up within-country rather
than cross-country effects. Coefﬁcient estimates on all variables do not differ either between
the two groups presented in Table 5.2 or from the results presented in column 3 of Table 5.1.
Giventherelativelowvariationofthecoveragevariableinthehigh-coveragegroupofcountries,
this variable is not signiﬁcant in column 1 of Table 5.2. Another fact which stands out is the
much greater homogeneity of the countries in the high-coverage sample as evidenced by the
much lower signiﬁcance of the country dummies compared to the countries in the low-coverage
sample.
A further robustness check on the results reported in Table 5.1 was done by estimating the
speciﬁcation in column 3 separately for each of the three sectors (manufacturing, trade and
business services). The results, not reported here, show that the association with the tenure
variable is stronger in trade and business services than in manufacturing.
14 The data do in fact show such a positive correlation.
15 The number of countries used in the estimation of column 1 of Table5.2 is just ﬁve since for the rest (BE, ES,
FR, IT and NL) of the high coverage countries, the tenure variable is missing, while this variable is available for
all 5 countries in the low coverage sample.20
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Table 5.2: Marginal Effects from a Probit Regression of Pr(Ei =1 )




Business services 0.052* -0.022
[0.0529] [0.367]
5-19 employees 0.043* 0.046*
[0.0963] [0.0754]
20-49 employees -0.001 0.036
[0.973] [0.128]
50-199 employees (Reference group)




Low-skilled BC (Reference group)
High-skilled BC 0.036 0.069***
[0.145] [0.00585]
Low-skilled WC 0.065* 0.039
[0.0698] [0.185]
High-skilled WC 0.089*** 0.129***
[0.00148] [0]
Proportion of employees
with over 5 years tenure
-0.066** -0.092***
[0.0485] [0.00157]
Competition intensity 0.014 0.047***
[0.472] [0.00950]





Observed prob. 0.212 0.242
Pseudo R2 0.0585 0.159
Robust p-values in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, some insight into the reasons behind the use or otherwise of external factors in hir-
ing pay can be gauged from estimates of equations 5.2 and 5.3 presented in Table 5.3 for the
seven countries that asked Q.II and Q.III and for which the tenure variable is available.16 High
16 The sample consists of seven out of the eight countries listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 since the tenure variable is
missing for Italy.21
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Table 5.3: Marginal Effects from a Probit Regression of Pr(Li =1 )& Pr(Hi =1 )




Business services 0.009 0.003
[0.584] [0.825]
5-19 employees 0.013 -0.032*
[0.451] [0.0560]
20-49 employees 0.027* -0.008
[0.0882] [0.597]
50-199 employees (Reference group)




Low-skilled BC (Reference group)
High-skilled BC 0.018 0.009
[0.288] [0.590]
Low-skilled WC 0.020 0.013
[0.287] [0.470]
High-skilled WC 0.004 0.068***
[0.843] [0.000576]
Proportion of employees
with over 5 years tenure
-0.025 -0.036*
[0.209] [0.0712]
Competition intensity 0.002 0.018
[0.878] [0.145]
Country dummies Yes Yes
F-test - country dummies χ2(6)=20.7 χ2(6)=62.2
Observations 3259 3258
Observed prob. 0.126 0.126
Pseudo R2 0.0351 0.0513
Robust p-values in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
collective agreement coverage prevents the payment of a lower wage, high-skilled white-collar
workers are positively associated with the payment of a higher wage, and long tenure decreases
the probability of payment of a higher wage.22
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6. Summary and Conclusions
We have undertaken an investigation into the use of external labour market conditions in hir-
ing pay. Employers’ replies to a ﬁrm-level survey on the procedures followed in determining
hiring pay suggest that external labour market conditions are not the main determinant of hir-
ing pay, especially in a slack labour market. Despite this overall picture, however, the data
show variation in hiring procedures both between as well as within countries. We ﬁnd that the
cross-country variation is strongly correlated with institutional factors (bargaining structures).
Within-country variation, on the other hand, appears to be correlated with workforce, ﬁrm and
product market characteristics. The skill and the tenure composition of the workforce, the col-
lective agreement coverage and product market competition appear to be associated with the
ﬂexibility or otherwise of new hires’ pay.
One of the main advantages of having survey data is that one can ask about the reasons behind
the actions. Employers were asked about the reasons behind their reluctance to deviate from the
going wage; fairness considerations together with the potential negativeimpact on effort are the
main explanations given. A question of potential interest to investigate next is the link between
the ﬂexibility of wages of incumbent employees and the ﬂexibility of wages of new hires.
This being a survey, and despite the fact that employers were asked hypothetical questions
about what they would do when faced with high unemployment or short labour supply, it is not
clear whether the results can be generalised. The surveys were conducted at time when labour
markets were in general tight; the economic and ﬁnancial crisis that has become more apparent
since the second half of 2008 might prove that employers behave differently.23
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Appendix
A. Differences Between Countries in the Survey Questions of Interest and
the Harmonisation Process Followed
The main differences between countries in the formulation of the three main questions of inter-
est (Q.I-Q.III in the main text) are the following:
Austria The Austrian questionnaire distinguishes the second option of Q.I. “Wage of similar
employees in the ﬁrm” into two further options: “Entry wage of similar employees” and
Current wage of similar employees”. Around 22% of Austrian ﬁrms that replied to this
question selected the ﬁrst option, and around 25% of ﬁrms selected the second. For
harmonisation purposes, replies to the more reﬁned options have been added together and
treated similarly to the replies to the second option by ﬁrms in other countries.
France, Italy, and Poland In the French, Italian and Polish survey ﬁrms were not asked to
select one of the four options provided in Q.I but to rank, on a 4-point scale, each option
according to its importance for the ﬁrm. The ranking of the options in terms of relevance
extends from 1 to 4, where 1 denotes “not relevant” and 4 denotes “very relevant”.
In order to systematically incorporate these three countries into the analysis, we applied
the following procedure to map the responses. The goal was to compile a binary variable
which would indicate, for a particular ﬁrm, whether internal or external factors are the
most important in determining the wages of new hires. The mapping proceeded in three
stages. First, if an internal factor was given a higher relevance score than either of the ex-
ternal factors, then internal factors were considered dominant (conversely, if an external
factor was given higher relevance than either of the internal factors, then external factors
were considered dominant). The majority of responses for the three countries, 60.4%,
were mapped at this stage. For observations not mapped in the ﬁrst stage, we compared
the average relevance score (based on non-missing observations) for internal and exter-
nal factors, and assigned observations to the appropriate group where one average was
higher. At this stage, an additional 20.6% of the observations were mapped. Finally, for
the remaining unmapped observations, we counted whether one set of factors had fewer
refusals than the other, and assumed that fewer denials to respond meant that that set of
factors was more relevant. At this stage, a further 7.9% of responses were classiﬁed. At
the end, 11% of responses could not be mapped, and as such were excluded from the
analysis for Question I.
Greece In Greece, Q.Iwasasked slightlydifferently: “Besides thecollectivepayagreement en-
forced in your company which of the followingfactors is the most relevant in determining
the entry wage ofnewly hired employees?” Optionsb–e of thestandardised questionnaire
followed. For harmonisation purposes option a of the standardised questionnaire was re-
constructed using the replies to the Questions II and III which considers the possibility
that collective agreement prevents payment of a lower or a higher wage.
B. Deﬁnitions of the Variables Used in the Analysis
A description of the full survey questionnaire can be found in Druant et al., 2009. Here we
present the deﬁnitions of the right-hand side variables used in Tables 5.1-5.3.26
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Sectors of economic activity: Manufacturing (NACE rev.1.1 sectors 15-37), Distribution
(NACE rev.1.1 50-52), Business Services (NACE rev.1.1 70-74 92-93)
Collective agreement coverage: Proportion ofemployees coveredby thecollectiveagreement
enforced in the ﬁrm
Dominant skill group: Firms have been classiﬁed in four groups: according to which one
of the following skill/occupational groups is dominant: blue-collar low-skilled workers
(reference group), blue-collar high-skilled workers, white-collar low-skilled workers and
white-collar high-skilled workers.
Log of gross ﬂows: Log ofthe percentage of employeesleaving and joiningtheﬁrm duringthe
last year over ﬁrm total employment at the end of the year (with the implication that ﬁrms
for which the percentage of employees leaving and joining the ﬁrm is zero are excluded
from the analysis).
Employee tenure: Proportion of employees with over 5 years tenure in the ﬁrm
Competition intensity: 0,1 dummy to indicate whether the ﬁrm is likely or very likely to fol-
low its competitors in lowering prices (1) or not likely (0).Working PaPer SerieS
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